Here and there, sick lamplight
through window glass
taught us to distrust the deceitful mathematics of our perishing
eyes.
--F. T. Marinetti, Futurist
Manifesto, 1909
Over the past decade--indeed, since the publication of Aaron Wildavsky and Mary Douglas' work on risk and culture[1]--scholars have recognized that danger and risk are socially and culturally constructed. This doesn't mean that all danger is imagined or invented, however. Douglas correctly argued that human societies, whether "primitive" or "modern," face myriad risks to collectivities and individuals, but that social and cultural values acts as screens and selectors in terms of what dangers will be socially recognized and acted upon. Despite excellent work on defining the structure and practice of constructing danger, however, few scholars have demonstrated either how social constructions of danger shift over time, or how emerging hegemonic social groups might seek to reconfigure notions of risk and danger in order to validate their own accessions to power. In this paper I will demonstrate how an emerging elite of modernists, from social Catholics to technocrats, redefined social danger and places of haven in order to pass themselves off as the new guarantors of safety, hygiene, and sexual propriety. We shall see that, perhaps unintentionally, they availed themselves of existing vocabularies of danger and risk and blithely invented new categories of threats to persons and society. They also offered solutions, of course, yet they remained eerily silent about the inherent risks of those. The solutions themselves were materially built ones in which political and moral agendas resided in the silence of blueprints and traditionally "neutral" designs. In this discussion, I will depart from the agenda of Judith Walkowitz, who uses notions of danger as a way of reading cultural and social values,[2] and instead I will show how new notions of danger were used to acclimatize French society to a new set of material structures and political-economic leaders. As Mary Douglas writes, "...dangers to the body, dangers to children, dangers to nature [however we might construct nature, I might add] are available as so many weapons to use in the struggle for ideological domination."[3]
Before I begin a close examination of interwar France, however, I sense a need to historicize French constructions of risk, if only to indicate the way that collective memories of danger provided a vocabulary that modernists could use to reconstruct danger. There have been three great eras of danger in France, the sacred, the industrial, and the modern. The sacred notion of risk and danger, predominant well into the nineteenth century, defined danger as transgression or sin against Catholic or Christian values. The consequence of transgression--almost invariably defined as an individual act--was a threat to the order of things and society. Whether the acts be blasphemous, adulterous, anti-aristocratic, or merely egotistical, the stability of society was at stake. Without a stable monothestic deity, monogamous marriage, a unified ruling hierarchy, or the moral precedence of the society over the individual, Paris and Marseilles would become Sodom and Gomorrah. The solution to transgression was only rarely inquisitorial; most often it was individual confession, remission, and a mending of ways. For hopeless recidivists, incarceration and social segregation were the solutions.[4]
The bourgeois or industrial era of danger, extant really only for the century between 1840 and 1940, redefined threats not as sins, but as dangers, much in the sense as Walkowitz has defined them. We need to be precise, however, in that England was admittedly a more propitious site for the liberal construction of danger, given the greater sway there of that ideology in the Victorian era. Nonetheless, the fleux sociaux so often cited by commentators of the nineteenth century, from Parent-Duchâtelet to Tarde, were "social" only in the sense that they threatened a social order made from an agglomeration of individuals.[5] The problem of the prostitute was not that her misbehavior threatened society as a whole, but that the consequences of her actions would be disease and family degradation for individuals. Indeed, it was in this era that libertarians and anarchists often called for unrestricted prostitution as a matter of individual rights.[6] Perhaps the most common danger to nineteenth-century French citizens existed in workplaces, but the prevailing legal doctrine, akin to the notion of "assumed risk" in English common law, was that workers made individual choices to work at specific sites and accidents were their own problem, not the responsibility of the employer. One is reminded here, for example, of the incident in Zola's Germinal over timbering in the coal mine: if workers did not reinforce mineshaft ceilings properly and they were subsequently injured it was their problem, not that of the employer, who paid them on piece-rates. Ditto for pensions and the responsibility of workers to save. Only with the 1901 Law of Associations did the state recognize any systematic notion of solidarity and collective responsibility, and that legislation had more to do with anti-liberal efforts to enfore cartellization agreements among personnes legales than with protecting the public.[7]
If sin represented threat in the religious era and danger represented it in the liberal era, risk--a far more technical term, largely stripped of moral baggage--became the emerging term for the technocrats of the twentieth century. In its pure sense, risk represents precisely the culture of objectivity Theodore Porter discusses, one of professions who can claim detachment and purity of motive in their prescriptions.[8] In a France fraught by political and class division after 1920, claims to apolitical class transcendence offered a promise of certainly in an uncertain world. As a rhetorical construction, scientism could be used by its proponents to gain an upper hand over their rivals, ranging from Communist activists to Catholic traditionalists.[9] In the quantitative, clear models of numbers and a construction of society that preserved individuals as discrete entities yet invented society as statistical constructions, such as the newly-constructed "français moyen,"[10] the newly defined (or redefined) risks could be stated without ostensible prejudice and dealt with as wise public policy. In particular, the new risks were directed at the public's health, the consequence not of immoral behaviors, but of the inherent communicability of numerous diseases and the ostensible necessity of coordination in mass society.[11] Demography emerged in the hands of the new experts as a convenient way to talk about politics[12]--particularly the international threat of Geman numbers and the refusal of French women to remedy it[13]--in a language that had not culprits, but only people who appreciated the truth in the numbers and did their duties. In this way, the deep chasm identified by Tocqueville in French politics between justice and equality could somehow be elegantly elided through the use of statistics. Democracy could become a phenomenon of large numbers.
But I race ahead of my case, I fear. We should be careful not to read the subcultures of INSEE, the Commissariat du Plan, or Electricité de France into the practices and mentalities of interwar reformers. Lest we hallucinate 20/20 foresight through the rearview mirror of the present, we must be clear to say that the rhetoric of statistical certainty and quantifiable risk was not only historically impossible in the interwar era, it would never have had much resonance beyond the group of left-center reformers at the Musée Social--people who held stunningly sophisticated workshops on social questions and political economy to which only they themselves came.[14] If we are to write the history of the ideology of progress in France, we have to recognize that the rhetorical campaign of reformers in constructing new dangers had to be negotiated with existing cultural values and prejudices. The natalist campaign, for example, could not be persuasively framed merely as a demographic set of issues; it had to locate the source of moral turpitude and national danger on the bodies of women, replacing the Cartesian pineal gland with a deeply implanted moral compass. The new had to compromise with the old, not only because narratives of statistical risk lack the drama of those centering on personal danger and social decay, but also because framing the risks implied prescribing the solutions--solutions which required considerable public expenditure and the political backing to carry it out. Indeed, the new rhetoric of danger/risk and the elision of the difference between the two supplied the vehicle through which the modernists were to develop the political base to pursue their much broader agenda.
In a woefully under-appreciated book, Rosalind Williams has argued that a key characteristic of modern society resides in a transfiguration of underground spaces.[15] In the sacral era, those spaces were caves, shafts, and Stygian locales rife with mystery and danger. In the modern era, those spaces are quintessentially built ones. I shall extend that analysis to argue that not all built spaces are the same, and interwar modernists made a distinction between old and new space, but more significantly, they cherished spaces that partook of systems and ordered logics of configuration. Baron von Haussmann was their precursor; as Don Reid has indicated, the sewers he built represented an efficient, preconceived system that supplanted a tangle of underground fecal rivers.[16] Structure and system rendered a space once rife with biological and revolutionary bacilli--Jean Valjean key among them--into a hygienic haven, safe enough for white-attired royalty. Haussmann proved something essential to his reformist and modernist descendents: that built structures are more persuasive than words in convincing a public to change its ways. Just as the Eiffel Tower could symbolize a rationally ordered and transparent polity composed of myriad discrete and equal members in the 1880s, new workplaces, homes, and collective facilities could build new citizens, safe from the risks of decay. Even more significantly, urban facilities and architectures could implement what engineers today call "inhherently safe design," structuring, prescribing, and disciplining citizens to act in ways congruent with the social agendas of the experts.[17]
Indeed, decay and decadence were highly charged cultural and political terms in the interwar era, as Eugen Weber has recently argued (once again).[18] Despite an atavistic baggage of moralism the terms seemed to carry, modernists were not loath to utilize them, giving them new meanings more akin to outdated and obsolete. Rationalized novelty could therefore become the solution, but not without a very constructive sense of ambiguity in the language. Dangerous spaces were old ones, but they were fraught with risks both old and new: the dingy cabarets of working-class leisure could be represented with several meanings: as sites of moral lassitude and sexual promiscuity, hence endangering the moral health of the family, but also as loci of social diseases and individual infirmity. Commentator after commentator, from industrialists to Jesuits and state officials, descibed the dangers of thehusband's wanderings, "exposé aux contamination du restaurant, du cabaret," [emphasis added].[19] By contrast, were a husband to come home to a clean, orderly, and hygienic home, he would not be tempted to go to the "promiscuous" space of the cabaret.[20]
One might be tempted in retrospect to see far too much in common between the grimy working-class bars of Belleville and the glitzy Casino de Paris, a favored meeting place among the political elite: both encouraged male camaraderie around alcohol as patrons lasciviously leered at the personnel, yet the former were old, decrepit, and badly lit, while the latter glittered with electricity and new fixtures. Hence, the social danger arose not from the suggestion of licentious behavior or from alcohol, it inhered in the site of activity itself. Remaking France thus entailed remaking her social spaces, identifying sites of risk and constructing new havens of health. A new architecture for people like Le Corbusier or Robert Mallet-Stevens would prescribe proper behavior as it modernized the spirit, and new factory designs would direct an unruly working class toward healthy and productive new habits. Finally, new domestic structures would liberate women from the status of dishevelled brood mares, raising them to new heights as managers over rational domestic spaces. Just as in the new factories, domestic designs themselves would silently--and without moral castigations--prescribe proper, healthful, and family-friendly activities.[21]
So what sites did the modernists identify as dangerous, and how did their depictions imply new spatial configurations? Let us begin at the ground level, on the earth itself. Again, Haussmann indicated the way, and pavement and canalisations were the solution. Just as broad boulevards and sewers were to replace antiquated mud streets and cesspools in the 1850s and '60s, facilitating the evacuation of things dangerous to the body social (from excrement to employees), new transport systems would facilitate the flow of goods, services, utilities, and labor resources in and out of the cities. Gone was the profound sense of presence, of neighborhood, in which work, leisure (itself a contemporary construction), and real life shared a space, replaced by the multi-locational identities and personalities of worker, lover, neighbor, consumer, and family member.[22] The neighborhood had long sustained a certain disorderly mixing of roles in identites, contributing to a kind of messy radicalism in which demands for workplace dignity and quality goods merged, where the personal was inherently political. Grand urban planning and public works projects, promulgated under a banner of urban improvements and undoubtedly welcomed by many as an escape from high-priced urban slums following the Great War, proceeded apace, albeit more in the minds of Le Corbusier and the group around L'Esprit Nouveau than on the surface of the hexagon.
Yet the mentality of the interwar expert remained resolutely centered on reconstruction and the city. At the same moment an unplanned reconfiguration of urban space was in itself decompressing the îles insalubres of the city by the flight of the working class along the tram and subway lines toward the grim lotissements of the suburbs. Next to the arguably utopian visions of the soi-disant planners, workers themselves were reallocating urban space in their own unruly ways. Strategically, the new architects massively miscalculated. As industrial rationalization experts from Ernest Mattern to Jean Coutrot came to realize, changing quotidian practice in situ represented a usually insurmountable challenge, and rationalization was best implemented in entirely new facilities,[23] where space and workers' expectations were far more flexible. With the notable exception of Henri Sellier, urbanists passed over social conditions in the new working-class suburbs in silence, leaving them as critical sites for Communist construction. Though the Communists often enjoyed considerable success in organizing modern services for the new shanty towns,[24] the separation of workplaces from homes largely ghettoized those Communist achivements, contributing to a Communist subculture apart yet leaving Big Politics largely untouched.
The two most charged sites of danger were those associated with the feminine body, charged as they were with deep structures of social-psychological meaning: the chambres des bonnes and women's workplaces. While the former could be designed away simply by their deletion from new construction designs, the latter were locales simultaneously of considerable capitalist profit and necessary incomes for families and individuals.
The social construction of the maid's quarters in the interwar era presents a particularly lurid example of sexual fears and the continuing nuclearization of the family in both affective and sexual terms. While one has to recognize that bonnes were particularly distrusted for their occasional dreams of independence and flight from the tyranny of the maîtresse de maison--not to mention their "outrageous salaries"--these fifteen-year-olds from Brittany represented a dangerous intrusion into the private sanctuary of the home.[25] A vast literature had already depicted the bonne as a seductress,[26] eagerly luring husbands and virginal young sons to debaucheries in her chamber, but with the rise of public health and scientific rhetoric, her improprieties were medicalized. She would no longer simply lure the men into sin and debauchery, she would infect them with syphilis by her activity. Léon Bizard, a public health official wrote that in even hiring a bonne:
On risque ainsi de contaminer physiquement et moralement de jeunes êtres qui en sont à cet âge où les bons principes, commes les mauvais exemples, mettent une empreinte qui peut, pour longtemps, ne plus s'effacer.
As a consequence, he counselled:
[Il faut que nous] demandons à une Ligue existantes ou à venir de faire figurer dans ses statuts la lutte contre la contamination de la faille par les domestiques, mais surtout ne cessons pas de répandre autour de nous cette vérité: toute famille qui accepte auprès de ses enfants une personne étrangère sans s'être assurée de sa bonne santé, expose certainement ses enfants à une contamination d'autant plus facile que l'enfant sera plus jeune, plus exposé à ce que la bonne goûte sa soupe ou son biberon, joue avec lui ou l'embrasse.
Perhaps not surprisingly, in these narratives of domestic seexual danger, the culprit was the bonne, not the more likely suspect of the father or son, either of whom had incomparably more power to exploit the bonne sexually than she has to seduce them. The remedy was simple: hire a femme de ménage on an hourly basis instead, and have here commute into the 16th, 7th, or 8th arrondissements on public transit. In this light, it is interesting to note that a number of employers' associations resisted any taxes levied upon industry to pay for workers' housing; on the contrary, they preferred a combination of public transit expansion and the state subsidies for largely middle-class housing provided by the 1926 Loi Loucheur.[27] The bonne was to be banished not only from the upper floors, but, like the suburbanizing working class, from the neighborhoods of the bien pensant bourgeois. At risk of a perhaps too florid metaphor, one might say that the nineteenth century concern with the dangers urban canalisations was thus supplanted by a fear of feminine canals.
Of course, the most contested and criticized sites of danger were the workplaces where many women were employed. It was at this rhetorical locale where the Catholic construction of sin and moral turpitude merged with that of technocratic risk. Catholics put the issue in the boldest terms, writing about not only the temptations of unshackled sexuality for women in the workplace, but their subjection to too much disposable income, the "promiscuous mixing" of the sexes, and constant seductions they faced.[28] One author even fretted about factory girls having sex in the back of trucks that employers used to move workers to and from work sites.[29] At the same time, even the Director of the Paris Region Metals Association derided the damage to the family that arose from women's work outside the home, particularly with respect to its effects on the family.[30] Modernists reverted by contrast to issues of women's heath, which was presumably endanged by many kinds of employment. Using terms such as, "inappropriate to their physiognomy," these experts argued that the demographic future of France hinged upon women remaining at home, off of their feet, thereby preserving their uteruses.[31] About the rhetorically-constructed joyous haven of the home I will spare you the details and direct you to my own work elsewhere.
Fears of women's employment, of course, merged well with natalist concerns, and we are now, thanks to the work of Lou Roberts, Sîan Reynolds, and Cheryl Ann Koos,[32] quite well aware of the way that those discourses defined new ways of marking women and their bodies. The natalist agenda enjoyed perhaps the widest political consensus in the Assembly, supported by that inimitable location of dangers in both a traditional and moral sense. Straddling two eras, the natalist movement could indifferently mix notions of sin and risk whie targetting the most intimate parts of women's anatomy. Ironically, the construction of new sites of danger ended by invading the deepest privacy of France's citoyennes.
[1 ]Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky, Risk and Culture (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982).
[2 ]Walkowitz, City of Dreadful Delight: Narratives of Sexual Danger in Late-Victorian London (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).
[3 ]Douglas, Risk and Blame: Essays in Cultural Theory (New York: Routledge, 1992), 19.
[4 ]Yes, this is, of course, the obligatory footnote to Foucault's Discipline and Punish.
[5 ]Gabriel de Tarde, Essais et mélanges sociologiques (Paris: G. Masson: 1895), and Alexandre-Jean-Baptiste Parent-Duchâtelet, Hygiène publique, ou, Mémoires sur les questions les plus importantes de l'hygiene appliquée aux professions et aux travaux d'utilité publique (Paris : J.-B. Baillière, 1836).
[6 ][Footnote to Alain Corbin, Les filles de noce: misère sexuelle et prostitution (19ème et 20ème siècles) (Paris: Aubier Montaigne, 1978).]
[7 ][note to Fridenson/Straus edited volume, Edward C. Carter II, Robert Forster, and Joseph N. Moody, eds., Enterprise and Entrepreneurs in Nineteenth-and Twentieth-Century France (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), and to François Caron, An Economic History of Modern France (New York : Columbia University Press, 1979).
[8 ]Theodore M. Porter, Trust in Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public Life (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1995).
[9 ]See, for example, the moralist exhortations of a Catholic industrialist : Eugene Mathon (Président du Comité Central de la Laine), Crise économique et crise morale. Discours prononcé au Déjeuner ayany suivi la XIIe Assemblée Générale annuelle du Comité Central de la Laine, 19 avril 1934 (Paris: Comité Central de la Laine, 1934), or the moral tirade of even a relaticely "social" Catholic: Cecile Jeglot, "La jeune fille et le malaise moderne, " Dossiers de L'Action Populaire, 25 juin 1926.
[10 ]For a summary of the statistical invention of the avaerage Frenchman, see Alain Derosières, "Histoires des formes: statistiques et sciences sociales avant 1940," Revue français de sociologie 26 (May-June, 1985).
[11 ]By this logic, the cartellization tendency implicit in the 1901 Law can be read as an industrial strategy to mitigate risks, supported even by the most conservative industrialists, such as the one cited in n. 9, supra.
[12 ]Most particularly after the Great War in the work of François and Maurice Halbwachs; see Paul Rabinow, French Modern: Norms and Forms of the Social Environment (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989), 327-330.
[13 ]Georges Clemenceau stated this fear most explicitly during his interventions in the debate in the Assembly over the ratification of the treaty of Versailles, eerily noting that, at current birth-rates, by 1939-40, France's draft-age population would only be one-half the size of Germany's. See anon. "Etre ou ne plus etre?... Etre!," 15 août 1923, p. 13.
[14 ]A researcher is unremittingly struck by the brilliance and genuine social concern reflected in that institution's monthly publication, Le Musée Social.
[15 ]Rosalind Williams, Notes on the Underground (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990).
[16 ]Donald M. Reid, Paris Sewers and Sewermen (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991). Also of interest is Alain Corbin's stunning, The Foul and the Fragrant (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989).
[17 ]Perhaps the clearest recent example of inherently safe design is in ABB's new model of nuclear power plant: in failure mode (presumably caused by human error), the nuclear pile is flooded with cold water that circulates and cools by convection. This is in contrast to the classical design of nuke plants, where the failure mode is meltdown. A socially prescriptive inherently safe design can be seen in the self-fastening (or always-fastened) seatbelts that preceded airbags--human volition was annihilated by design, as riders had no choice to fasten or not.
[18 ]Tiresome as the argument of decadence might seem, its staying power might indicate its cedibility; see Eugen Weber, The Hollow Years: France in the 1930s (New York: Norton, 1994), Ch. 1. By contrast, the recent work of Patrick Fridenson argues that France was far more innovative in the interwar years than has usually been claimed. Is the glass half-full or half-empty, one wonders?
[19 ]Augusta Moll-Weiss, "De la meilleure utilisation du salaire familial," L'Art ménager 42 (juillet 1930), 261.
[20 ]Letter, Syndicat des mécaniciens chaudronniers et fondeurs de France to Ministre de Travaux Publics, 7 octobre 1920, in UIMM archives: AN série 39 AS 396. Undoubtedly, the popular knowledge of Zola's L'Assommoir contributed to this view of the cabaret. Scott Haine's new book explains this set of issues extensively.
[21 ]Even reformist trade unionists got into the act; see: Georges Benoit-Lévy, "L'aménagement scientifique des centres d'habitation," Le Peuple 13 février 1921. I have written extensively on this issue; see, for example, my "Machine Liberation: Inventing Housewives and Home Appliances in Interwar France," French Historical Studies (April, 1993), and several papers posted on my web site: http://www-personal.umich.edu/~rfrost/papers.
[22 ]Lenard R. Berlanstein, The Working People of Paris, 1871-1914 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984).
[23 ]Sylvie Schweitzer, Des engrenages à la chaîne. Les usines Citroën, 1915-1935 (Lyon: Presses Universitaires de Lyon, 1982), 15; Ernest Mattern, "Exemple vécu de la formation d'un ingénieur d'usine," typescript, 1941 (provided by Yves Cohen, La Villette CRSHT, Paris); Jean Coutrot, Les Méthodes d'organisation rationnelle et ce qu'elles peuvent apporter à l'activité économique française, pamphlet (Rennes: Imprimeries Réunies, 1937); and Maurice Torfs, L'Efficience en 20 leçons (Bruxelles: Editions de l'Efficience, 1933).
[24 ]Tyler Stovall, The Rise of the Paris Red Belt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), and Annie Fourcaut, ed., Banlieue rouge, 1920-1960: années Thorez, années Gabin: archetype du populaire, banc d'essai des modernités (Paris : Ed. Autrement, 1992).
[25 ]This was particularly true with the newly-separated bathing and defecating spaces; see Georges Vigarello, Le propre et le sale: L'hygiène du corps depuis le Moyen Age (Paris, Editions du Seuil, 1985), 285. See more generally, Anne Martin-Fugier, La place des bonnes: la domesticité féminine à Paris en 1900 (Paris : B. Grasset, 1979), and Geneviève Fraisse, Femmes toutes mains. Essai sur le service domestique (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1979).Dr. Léon Bizard, La Syphilis et les Domestiques.; Paris: Imprimerie Tancrède, 1923. (offprint from Bulletin de la Société Française de Prophylaxie Sanitaire et Morale nos. 2, 3 & 5 (mars, avril, & juillet 1922), & no. 1 (février 1923).
[26 ]Seen for example, in Zola (Pot-Bouille) Octave Mirbeau (Le Journal d'une femme de chambre), Léon Frapié (La Figurante), and Emile & Jules de Goncourt (Germinie Lacerteux).
[27 ]M. Lambert-Ribot, "Les Logements ouvriers dans l'industrie," La Quincaillerie nouvelle, 18 août 1930 (author was Director of the Paris Region Metals Industries Council). Trade union writer alleged that the head of the Confédération Nationale du Patronat Français, Villiers, took a similar position: J. Lapierre, "La contribution des employeurs à la construction des logements ouvriers," Le Peuple 4 septembre 1930. The Loi Loucheur was passed in 1926, but the implementation decree was not issued until December of 1928, presumably to minimize its impact on the franc stabilization plan of Poincaré: anon., "L'Hygiène... et la loi Loucheur," Petit Guide du logementsupplément au No 64 de La Revue de la famille (avril 1933): 19.
[28 ]anon., "Budgets ouvriers. Le Travail et la Famille," Dossiers de l'Action Populaire, 25 octobre 1923, 8. See also Eve Badouin, La Mère au travail et le retour au foyer (Paris: Bloud & Gay, 1931), 59. The latter quotes Cardinal Manning extensively. It should be noted that the papal encyclical, Casti Connubii, by Pius XI, in December of 1930.
[29 ]anon. "Le temoignage d'une mere de famille," Dossiers de L'Action Populaire, 10 janvier 1926.
[30 ]memo: M. Grignon [aide to Poincaré], re: meeting with M. Richemond (pres of Caisse de Comp de la Seine], 19 octobre 1927, AN série 39 AS 3993/2.
[31 ]Intervention of Dr. Marcland, in "Résolution rélative à l'emploi de la main-d'oeuvre féminine dans l'industrie des transports," in Commissions Départementales du Travail dans l'Industrie (Instituées en vertu de l'Art. 113 du Livre 2 du Code de Travail), Compte rendu du VIIIe Congrès National tenu à Paris les 5, 6, 7, et 8 octobre 1928 (Paris: Imprimerie Municipale, 1928), 144.
[32 ]Mary Louise Roberts, Civilization without Sexes (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), Reynolds, France Between the Wars: Gender and Politics (New York: Routledge, 1996), and Koos, {dissertation defended at USC under Elinor Accampo, 1996).